

Japan's Foreign Policy toward the Arab World in the 1990's : The Post Cold War Era, Gulf Crisis, and Peace Process

Sa'ad ABUDAYEH*

Abstracts

The purpose of this study is to examine the new trends of Japan's Foreign Policy in the Arab World in the 1990 and to explore Japan's new role after the dramatic changes which took place in the 1990's like the end of the Cold War, the Gulf Crisis which was the first crisis after the end of the Cold War, and the peace developments between the Arab World and the Israelis after the Madrid Conference. The paper explored the constraints on and capabilities of Japan's Foreign Policy toward the Arab World in the period 1990-1995. Historically, the U. S. sought to rebuild Japan into a strong ally in the Cold War against the U. S. S. R. Japan was accused of taking advantage of U. S. policy containment to protect its interests and to secure its access to foreign markets. Contrary to this traditional idea, we found that there is a limit to the American pressure on Japan. Japan had its own diplomacy in many occasions and expected to have a new role in the 1990's which commensurate with its economical role.

There are constraints on the new role by western countries and Asian neighbors, and there is a fear that Japan is becoming too powerful a country and it will repeat the experience of the thirties and forties. However, there is no such fear in the Middle East, and there are no negative feeling nor any psychological barriers between the Japanese and the Arabs. The two sides can complete with each other.

This study revealed the constraints on and capabilities of Japan Foreign Policy in the Middle East prime issues like the Gulf Crisis and peace process. The Gulf Crisis is a vivid example of the pressure on Japan to play new role outside of financial support. There are variables which constrained Japan's Foreign Policy in the Gulf Crisis. In the Gulf Crisis Japan strived for diplomatic autonomy, and tried to maintain a balance between the two side in any conflict. This policy was much clear in the Arab Israeli conflict.

The main constraints on Japanese Foreign Policy toward Israel, during the Cold War was exercised by Arabs. After the peace process, Japan played an active role in the peace process between the two sides. Japan participated in the multilateral track of the peace process between Israel and its neighbors.

The role of Japan in the Gulf Crisis was wider than it has ever been. In the two cases

* Visiting Professor of Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan.

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Japan played new role within the traditional role of Japan international behavior to give priority to economic growth over political leadership. In general, the government of Japan is operating under political constraints mostly domestic and economical. Both of them are capabilities of Japan Foreign Policy toward the Arab World.

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An Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine the new trends of Japan's Foreign Policy in the Arab World in the 1990's and to explore Japan's new role after the dramatic changes which took place in the 1990's like

- 1) The end of the Cold War, and the break up of the Soviet Union, among other developments like the unification of Germany
- 2) The Gulf Crisis which was the first crisis after the end of the Cold War
- 3) The peace development between the Arab world and the Israelis after the Madrid Conference in 1991 and developments following the signing of peace treaty between Israel and its neighbors, Jordan and PLO in 1993, 1994.

We will try to explore what are the constraints on and capabilities of Japan's Foreign Policy toward the Arab World in the period (1990-1995).

Historical Sketch about the American Influence on Japan Foreign Policy

Because of Japan's geostrategic importance between the two superpowers, U. S. and U. S. S. R. during the Cold War, Japan relied heavily on the U. S. which sought to rebuild Japan into a strong ally, in the Cold War against the U. S. S. R. Many studies reflected the same idea that Japan's foreign policy after the second world war was subordinated to the U. S. and Japan hadn't its own diplomatic autonomy. Japan was accused of taking advantage of U. S. policy containment to protect its interests, and to secure its access to foreign markets.

The American Influence and the Arab Israeli Conflict

In the Arab Israeli Conflict, Japan gave priority to its own interest and regardless of the American position, Japanese companies avoided any direct contact with Israel until 1989 when ten companies were established in Israel by Japan.¹⁾

Economically, the Japanese companies adopted an attitude of deliberately avoiding direct business contact with Israeli firms.²⁾ So the main constraints on Japanese foreign policy toward Israel during the Cold War was by Arabs. Any American influence was not effective.

The New Role of Japan in the 1990's

When the Gulf Crisis started in 1990 and when the peace process took place between Israel and the Arabs in 1991, Japan was expected to have a high international profile,³⁾ and to have a new sense of international responsibility⁴⁾ and to leave the neutralist tendencies that prevailed during the Cold War especially after its economy revived beyond all expectations.⁵⁾ In any event, Japan must have a new global political role commensurate with its economical role.⁶⁾

The Constraints on the New Role of Japan

There are constraints on the new role of Japan by western countries and Asian⁷⁾ neighbors, who fear that Japan is becoming too powerful a country and that it will repeat the experience of the thirties and forties, or fear that Japan role will be on their expense. However, in the Middle East, there is no fear that Japan will cause political or economical hardships. Moreover, there are no memories of the Second World War among the Arabs against Japan, and there is no negative feeling nor any psychological barriers between the Japanese and the Arabs.⁸⁾ So any role of Japan toward the Arab World doesn't need changes

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at home in Japan, and the Japanese domestic influence won't be a barrier. The two sides can complete with each other.

The New Role and the Gulf Crisis in 1990

The Gulf Crisis started in 1990 and created a problem to Japan which depends on Mideast oil as primary source of energy. In Japan the argument arose that Japan must stay completely out of the conflict to secure its economic interest. Japan receives 55% of its oil from the Gulf states. Any decision would be very difficult. In spite of that, Japan made the difficult decision to join the western powers. The decision of Japan followed the European Community decision of August 4th, 1990 to impose trade sanctions against Iraq.⁹⁾

Japan banned Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil imports and blocked Japanese exports to those countries, suspended all capital transactions and froze aid to Iraq. That decision was hard on Japan which imported 12% of its oil supply from Kuwait and Iraq.¹⁰⁾

The American Influence in the Gulf Crisis

In the Gulf Crisis Japan choice was limited. The U. S. acted as the hegemony leader and led the international coalition against Iraq. Japan couldn't play the role it wanted to play. Although in some occasions Japan's Foreign Policy appeared very close to the western countries. In the Iran-Iraq war and contrary to the official position of Japan not to get entangled by any side in the war, Japan acted politically the same as the western powers. It went further and served with Algeria and Switzerland as an intermediary between the U. S. and Iran to free the western hostages in the early 1990's.¹¹⁾ In some other occasions Japan has its own diplomacy. For example Japan didn't condemn Iran when the international furor in 1989 continued against the Iranian President Khamenei who condemned Salman Rushdie for his *Satanic Verses* Book.¹²⁾ Moreover, Japan refused to send the mine sweepers to the Gulf when the tanker war started between Iran and Iraq in 1987.¹³⁾

In short, Japan had its diplomacy during the war between Iran and Iraq, but Japan could not repeat the same role again in the Gulf Crisis in 1990. the criticism became greater than it was in 1987.¹⁴⁾

The Pressures on Japan in the Gulf Crisis

Japan was under external and internal pressure¹⁵⁾ in the Gulf Crisis. The blame was from both sides. The U. S. wanted Japan to have a military role in the crisis. Japan didn't welcome

any military role. In general, Japan international behavior gave priority to economic growth over political or military leadership.¹⁶⁾ Moreover, there was domestic pressure on the Japanese government not to join any combat in the Gulf. Japan's constitution prohibited any direct involvement in overseas combat activities. A poll conducted in December 1990 had found 62 of those Japanese questioned opposed any involvement in the Gulf efforts outside of financial support.¹⁷⁾

Japan Deployment

The Japanese cabinet on Oct. 16th, 1990 approved a plan to send non combat soldiers, about 1000 members of Japan Armed Forces, known as the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Saudia Arabia. But, the Premier Kaifu faced criticism by his people for his eagerness to please the U. S. President George Bush. The Socialist Party leader Takako Doi, on Oct. 16th, vowed to fight the proposal and accused the premier that he was asking the youth of Japan to shed blood on a battle field.

More Domestic and External Pressure

The proposal was opposed not by the opposition party but by the Japanese public¹⁸⁾ who disapproved the plan by a two-to-one margin according to opinion surveys. the Government officials were cautious that the proposal would demonstrate Japanese support for the efforts against Iraq. Even the Asian neighbors expressed strong reservation against the plan. Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on Nov. 10th, 1990 formally withdrew the proposal.

Financial Support and Domestic Pressure in the Gulf Crisis

Trying to avoid an involvement in combat, Japan insisted on Providing only financial support. On Jan. 17th, 1991 the Japanese premier Toshiki Kaifu said that his nation would extend the maximum support possible for allied military action, but wouldn't join the combat effort. Japan promised further financial aid to the allied effort. It pledged \$9 billion dollars in new aid to fund the war effort. The total amount by the end of Jan. 1991 was \$13 billions which meant 1/5 of the amount which was spent on the crisis till then. The opposition party demanded that any funding must be devoted to non combat operations. The Japanese public worries increased.¹⁹⁾ The domestic pressure effectively constrained Japanese Foreign Policy toward any form of military participation. When premier Toshiki Kaifu proposed on Jan.

24th, 1991 that Japan sent non combat air craft to the Gulf to help evacuate the refugees from the area, the opposition was very strong from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and from opposition politicians.

What made the Japanese worry more about deploying aircraft to the region was the Iraqi ambassador to Japan who said that any military air craft operating in the area would be subject to attack.²⁰⁾ Japan already was reluctant to use any military force or to get entangled in the Gulf Crisis. The constitution of Japan forbade the use of the military for non defensive purposes. The Japanese regarded this constitution as a guarantee that the nationalistic militarism of the 1930's and 1940's wouldn't be repeated. The domestic opinion opposed the decision to attack Iraq. According to public survey the Japanese public was against attacking Iraq. So more pressure went on the measures which were proposed by Premier Kaifu to help fund the Gulf Crisis.²¹⁾

Criticism of Japan

Japan strived for diplomatic autonomy in the Gulf Crisis. The official position was not to get entangled by in that war. Although, in some cases Japan acted politically the same way as western powers but Japan tried to avoid as much as she could the direct involvement. but the criticism increased. Although Japan's contributions to the Gulf Crisis costs were very high, criticism against Japan continued. Japan's contribution to the Gulf War wasn't fully appreciated because of the slowness with which it was offered. And Japan was criticized for its reluctance to provide any personnel, and was charge of hiring mercenaries to fight for its interests.²²⁾ Japan did its best to avoid participating in any combat in the Gulf Crisis. In spite of the high percentage of Japan contributions to the Crisis cost, the criticism continued in many forms. The criticism came for the press and from formal figures. There was a great criticism that Japan's contribution in the international efforts in the Gulf Crisis was insufficient. Japan was accused of sending only shipments of goods consisting of 800 vehicles of the original one billion aid pledge for the Gulf. Moreover, Japan was accused of recruiting only three doctors²³⁾ for 100 member medical unit that had been pledged for the Gulf. More criticism to Japan by congress members for a lack of cooperation in the Gulf efforts. The House, on Sept. 12th, 1990 passed an Authorization Bill calling for Japan to assume the entire cost of basing 50,000 U. S. troops in Japan. If Japan didn't pick up the cost, the amendment called for 5000 troops a year to be withdrawn.²⁴⁾ When George Bush addressed the joint session of congress on Sept. 11th, 1990, the House majority leader Richard Gephardt criticized Japan.

Don Quayle who was visiting Japan, on May 21st, 1991, urged Japan to pay the difference

of the exchange rate between the dollar and yen which was half a billion dollars and which led to a friction between Japan and U. S. In December 1991, Japan, among other countries, was accused of supporting Iraqi weapons projects. The report which was released by the International Atomic Energy Agency, on Dec. 11th, 1991 revealed the names of the companies who sold equipment to Iraq for using in clandestine efforts to develop atomic weapons.²⁵⁾ Japan was expected to pay more of the cost of the Crisis. When England declared in July, 1991 that its cost in the Persian Gulf was \$4.15 billion, Japan was expected to pay it with Saudi Arabia, U. A. E., and Kuwait.²⁶⁾

Japan's Participation after the Cease Fire in the Gulf

The public opinion in Japan, changed after the cease fire and supported the decision of sending the Japanese tankers to the Gulf. Japan could participate in the allied effort and the participation was justified in the allied effort to clear the explosives on the grounds that Japanese tankers traveled the Persian Gulf. The public opinion supported the decision because the mission was regarded safe.

Helping Refugees

The Japanese Government showed other interest and contributed on 24th, April 1991 with an additional \$82.5 million for emergency relief for refugees from Iraq. Two days later, Japan pledged \$100 million to the office of the U. N. High Commissioner to help Kurdish refugees.

The Diplomacy of Japan

Trying to avoid the turmoil in the Middle East, the Japanese Premier Kaifu canceled a planned trip to the region. But later to avoid the complaints from the U. S. and its allies that Japan wasn't doing enough to assist the Gulf efforts, the Japanese Premier Kaifu visited Jordan on Oct. 4th, and met with Iraqi deputy premier Taha Yasin Ramadan who refused to negotiate as long as foreign troops remained on Arab soil. Kaifu insisted on an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait first.²⁷⁾

The Position of Iraq toward Japan

Iraq treated Japan like western countries, who defied Iraq to keep their missions open. On

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24th August 1990, Iraqi troops surrounded nine embassies. The Japanese embassy was one of them. And when Iraq hold hostages, there were 500 Japanese among the 9600 western foreigners.²⁸⁾ But when the Former Japanese Premier Yasuhiro Nakasone visited Baghdad on Nov. 4th, 1990 and met with the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein twice, he obtained the release of 74 Japanese.²⁹⁾ Japan tried to avoid any military role and offered covering the losses sustained because of the crisis and volunteered to offer compensation to the Arab states who were hurt economically by the U. N. trade embargo of Iraq. Japan promised to send medical personnel and some supplies to the U. S. led Gulf forces.³⁰⁾ On August 29th, 1990 Japan unveiled a package of economic and logistical contributions to the international efforts. On 30th, Japan declared the package worth would be \$ one billion.³¹⁾

On Nov. 10th, 1990, and after the LDP and opposition leaders reached an agreement to send civilian medical technical personnel to the Gulf, the Japanese team of seven doctors and nurses who went to Saudi Arabia returned home.³²⁾

The poll which was conducted in December opposed any involvement in the Gulf Crisis outside of financial support.³³⁾ There were political constraints under which the government of Japan was operating. Japanese resisted any military entanglements, and Japan refuses to send members of SDF abroad in combat roles even as members of U. N. Peace Keep Operation.

Peace Keeping Force


It took a long time until the Japanese Diet Parliament on June 15th, 1992 agreed on a bill which allowed up to 2000 personnel to be dispatched abroad to participate in U. N. Peace Keeping missions. The U. S., however, was critical of Japan's motives, and accused Japan of practicing "checkbook diplomacy"—"a willingness to pay for international peace keeping operation, but not to support them with personnel."

The scope of Japan's participation was limited. The legislation of 1992 permitted a small number of armed forces to be dispatched abroad but not for the threat or use of force. This policy was fully compatible with the constitution which forbade the use of the military for non defensive purposes.

Among the restrictive clauses was a limit on the forces' weaponry to small side-arms. The forces were authorized to go to region where the cease fire had been declared, but had to evacuate the area if the cease fire was broken.

Ongoing U.N. operations

(as of Dec. 1, 1994)



UNTSO: Truce supervision in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel (6/48 to present)

UNMOGIP: Observer group in India and Pakistan (1/49 to present)

UNFICYP: Peacekeeping force in Cyprus (3/64 to present)

UNDOF: Disengagement observer force in Golan Heights (6/74 to present)

UNIFIL: Interim force in southern Lebanon (3/78 to present)

UNIKOM: Iraq-Kuwait observation mission (4/91 to present)

UNAVEM II: Angola verification mission (8/91 to present)

ONUSAL: Observer mission in El Salvador (7/91 to present)

MINURSO: Referendum mission in Western Sahara (9/91 to present)

UNPROFOR: Protection force in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia (2/92 to present)

ONUMOZ: Operation in Mozambique (12/92 to present)

UNOSOM II: Operation in Somalia (5/93 to present)

UNOMIG: Observer mission in Georgia (8/93 to present)

UNMIH: Mission in Haiti (9/93 to present)

UNOMIL: Observer mission in Liberia (9/93 to present)

UNAMIR: Assistance mission in Rwanda (10/93 to present)

SOURCE : FOREIGN MINISTRY

JAPAN AND THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Arab Israeli conflict was a sensitive issue to Japan which tried to maintain a balance between the two sides for example when Japan's Premier Toshiki Kaifu received PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat on Oct. 3rd, 1989, next month he received the Israeli foreign minister.³⁴⁾

Japan's dependence on Mideast oil as the primary source of energy was inescapable. In 1985, Japanese import of oil was 91%, which reflected an excessive dependence on Mideast oil as the primary source of energy. This was one of the main constraints on Japan's diplomacy in the Middle East. Japan couldn't respond like the U. S. by using a military rapid-deployment force for times of crisis.³⁵⁾

Japan and the Peace Talks

After Madrid Conference and the new development in the Middle East Peace, it was expected that Japan would seek a wider role in achieving a lasting peace, both diplomatically and economically and to strengthen its relations with both Israel and Arab Nations.³⁶⁾

For the first time in the Arab Israeli conflict Japan joined the Mideast talks. It was expected that Japan was seeking a wider role in diplomacy in the Middle East.³⁷⁾ Japan's role in the bilateral and multilateral was clear. Japan is now participating in the multilateral working group on the environment. Japan is a major partner in the working groups for regional economic development and water source development.

Japan is expected to play an active role in strengthening relations between Israel and its neighbors because it is a joint organizer of the multilateral track of the peace process. Although Japan's role in the multilateral talks is clear, Israel has sought Japan's economic assistance which will help people in the region feel that peace has as really come.

Israel demanded assistance from Japan to overcome the poverty which creates fertile grounds for the growth of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.³⁸⁾

The Israeli Premier tried to motivate the Japanese directly and indirectly, arguing that Israel will be the regional center for commerce and industry and Israel and Japan can complement each other instead of working parallel in the same area.³⁹⁾

It was expected that the conflict between Israel and the Arab World put a constraint on Japan's Foreign Policy. The first visit of the Israeli Premier to Japan didn't reflect any of new trends in Japan's Foreign Policy toward Israel. What the Israeli Premier got were two pacts: the science and technology cooperation pact, which was the first that Japan concluded with any Middle Eastern was the second after that had with Egypt.⁴⁰⁾

Japan is still reluctant to get entangled in any conflict. The peace in the Middle East is still in its beginning. Israel is still occupying the Golan Heights and south Lebanon. This made Japan oppose sending a fact-finding mission to the Golan Heights to weigh possible Japanese assistance in U. N. peace keeping operating there. The cabinet showed much caution against this suggestion. Japanese official expressed their concern about Japanese participation in UNDOF on the grounds that the operation, unlike the other U. N. missions in which Japan has participated so far, will probably be conducted over a long time.

One of the officials expressed the concern in an other say. He said "it is wrong for the Foreign Ministry to think it is taken for granted that personnel can be sent whenever requested (by the U. N.)."⁴¹⁾

In general, Japan is still hesitant to deal with Israel. Japan is committed to five multilateral working groups that have been meeting in tandem with bilateral talks between

Israel and the Arab states.⁴²⁾

Psychological Barriers

Japan's caution might be related to economical and psychological reasons. With respect to the future, Japanese-Arab relations is promising. If the peace works out, there will be no problem for Japan to deal with the Middle East. There is a large market in the Arab world and there are not any psychological barriers between the Japanese and Arabs. The Arabs have no negative feeling toward Japanese and Arabs have no negative memories of Japanese activities during Second World War unlike Koreans or Chinese, for example. But it must be mentioned that Japanese people have negative feeling toward Jewish people. This is largely attributable to the influence from books, ranging from *The Merchant of Venice* by Shakespeare to anti-Semitic books written by Masami Uno.⁴³⁾

Nobuo Fujiwara, president of the Japan Israel Culture and Business Association, which was established in April 1994 said "Israel has a completely different culture and by acknowledging the difference we will be able to improve relations for the first time."⁴⁴⁾

To summarize what has been said we can mention the following :

- 1) The peace process accomplishments in 1993-1994 didn't affect the Japanese diplomacy in the Middle East. The Japanese Commitment is within the framework of the five multilateral working groups that have been meeting intadem with the bilateral talks taking place between Israel and the Arab states.
- 2) If the peace process doesn't work out, this will not be to the advantage of Israel. Japan was reluctant to deal with Israel during the conflict. Since the peace process started, Japan has a new role for the first time in the peace talks. Japan committed \$200 million over two years to help implement the peace process in the region following the September 1993 Agreement between PLO and Israel. Japan spent \$10 million on housing for families of Palestinian police officers. Japan expected to establish social infrastructure such as hospitals and schools in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Diplomatically, after Rabin's visit to Japan, Japan Premier Murayama promised that Japan would call on Syria to make a greater efforts to establish peaceful relations with the Jewish state.

Japan's Foreign Policy continued to be balanced between Israel and Arab states. For example, when Rabin asked Japan to open an office of the Japan External Trade Organization in Israel to facilitate business activities, Mr. Ryutaro Hashimoto, Minister of International Trade and Industry, answered that it was too difficult to open an office of [Japan External Trade Organization] in Israel because of the Nation's tight fiscal conditions. He took a balanced position and suggested that M. I. T. I. invite trainees from Israel next month

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under a two week training program aimed at providing know how to the Middle East on promoting development of small and medium size firms. Other participants—Jordanians, Palestinians, and Egyptians—might be invited. Another example of this even handed policy by Japan is Murayama's response to Rabin. When the latter asked for assistance for the Palestine authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho. Murayama responded that Japan would continue to provide assistance to the Palestine Authority in the area as well as to Israel neighboring nations.⁴⁵⁾ Japan took into consideration the small population of Israel.

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There are constraints on the new role by western countries and Asian neighbors, and there is a fear that Japan is becoming too powerful a country and it will repeat the experience of the thirties and forties. However, there is no such fear in the Middle East, and there are no negative feeling nor any psychological barriers between the Japanese and the Arabs. The two sides can complete with each other.

This study revealed the constraints on and capabilities of Japan's Foreign policy in the Middle East prime issues like the Gulf Crisis and peace process. The Gulf Crisis is a vivid example of the pressure on Japan to play new role outside of financial support. There are variables which constrained Japan's Foreign Policy in the Gulf Crisis. In the Gulf Crisis Japan strived for diplomatic autonomy, and tried to maintain a balance between the two side in any conflict. This policy was much clear in the Arab Israeli conflict.

The main constraints on Japanese foreign policy toward Israel, during the Cold War was exercised by Arabs. After the peace process, Japan played an active role in the peace process between the two sides. Japan participated in the multilateral track of the peace process

between Israel and its neighbors.

The role of Japan in the Gulf Crisis was wider than it has ever been. In the two cases Japan played new role within the traditional role of Japan international behavior to give priority to economic growth over political leadership. In general, the Government of Japan is operating under political constraints mostly domestic and economical. Both of them are capabilities of Japan's Foreign Policy toward the Arab World.

At present there are three great economic powers in the world, the U. S., Europe and Japan. These powers all have ties with the Arab World. Among them Japan has the weakest influence in the Arab World, despite its dependence on Arab oil. In the past and, during the Cold War, Japan depended heavily on the U. S. to secure its interests in the Arab World. But now, there are some indicators which reflect that Japan has other priorities in its diplomacy. Relations with the U. S. are no longer top priority. Japan has a priority now to strengthen ties with other Asian nations. Contribution to the U. N. is another priority. In general, some trends now reflect that Japan does not have the same old interest to maintain solid ties with the U. S. Some writings reflect that Japan is fed up with U. S. pressure and Japanese concessions in bilateral.⁴⁶⁾ Some commentators are pessimistic that Japan will have an Economic Cold War with the U. S.⁴⁷⁾ Others are more pessimistic to the degree that they expect that Japan will take over America economically by the end of this century.⁴⁸⁾ However, these studies often overestimate Japan's future. For example, studies in the seventies mistakenly predicted that Japan would be a nuclear state by the eighties.⁴⁹⁾

To be objective, it is true that Japan is the first example in the history of a state wielding huge economic and technological power with corresponding political or military might. And it is true that Japan is the third largest exporter of manufactured goods ; the second largest contributor to the U. N. budget and to the World Bank⁵⁰⁾ ; and the largest donor of foreign aid in the last three years.⁵¹⁾

We can argue that the role does not relate only to economic capabilities Japan needs to participate in political institutions. There are 150 plus slots allocated to Japan in U. N. secretariat ; only 88 are filled.

According to some of analysts confusion still exists over Japan policy on participation in U. N. missions. There is no clear international consensus on the distinction between military and non military activities of U. N. Under the present law, Japanese participation is limited to such non combat activities. The troops are sent to sweat and not to bleed. If any Japanese is killed, the government will be thrown into confusion. This happened in the spring of 1993 when Japanese volunteer was killed in Cambodia.⁵²⁾

Inside Japan the government and people are not ready to commit themselves to a larger international role. it is widely expected that Japan's political instability will last another

couple of years. The government has been reshuffled three times in the past 18 months.

In short Japan has failed to make clear what new roles it can or wants to play as a permanent council member for the sake of global peace and prosperity leading into the 21st century.⁵³⁾ Moreover, outside Japan there has been little support for the Japanese role in U. N. although the U. S. officially supported Japanese role in U. N. but it did little to advance it. France and the U. K. are resisting any expansion of Japan's role, expecting that it would be by at their expense, or will open the door to other countries.⁵⁴⁾

It looks clear that new trends are emerging between Japan and her Asian neighbors. Some of them have put aside what happened 50 years ago.⁵⁵⁾ These neighbors have growing economic possibilities which attract Japan's attention.⁵⁶⁾ This trend looks the strongest among Japan's foreign policy priorities. Next autumn Japan will host the summit of the leaders from the 18 member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Moreover, Japan concentrated on the regional grouping of ASEAN Members Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand put together are a more prosperous population than all of Latin America and import more agricultural and industrial goods from the U. S. than the latter. In the year 2000, it is expected that two thirds of the world's manufacturing capabilities will be located in this region. Since half of these ASEAN countries are Islamic (Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia) their growing ties with Japan may bridge the gap between Japan and the rest of the Islamic or Arab world.

In the 1995 budget Japan aimed to construct deeper relationships with other Asian countries. Eight point two billion yen have been earmarked for this purpose.

Asia, is the priority which Japan concentrates on now. This will be the major thrust of Japanese Foreign Policy toward the Arab World in the current circumstances of peace in East and West Asia. If there is change in these peaceful and economically profitable circumstances, Japanese Foreign Policy will take into account and revert to its old priority of ties with the U. S.

NOTES

- 1) Statement by Raouji Tateyama, chief economist at the Japan Institute of Middle East Studies. See *Japan Times*, Dec. 13, 1994.
- 2) Japanese foreign policy toward Vietnam was another example of the limit of American influence on Japan.
- 3) Forsberg, Aaron Patrick, *America and Resurgence of Post War, Japan after the Occupation* [Economy Recovery, United States] (U. S., Austin, The University of Texas PhD 1993).
- 4) Funahashi, Yoichi, "Japan and America : Global Partners," *Foreign Policy*, 86, Spring 1992, p. 32.
- 5) Ibid.

- 6) See : A) Eugne Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post Cold War Era : Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," in *Asian Survey*, Vol XXXIV No. 5 May 1994, p. 438.
 B) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Coping with Japan," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 92-93, p. 108.
- 7) Nye, op. cit. pp. 108, 110, 111.
- 8) An interview with Nobuo Fujiwara, President of Japan-Israel Culture and Business Association, wrote about the psychological barriers between Japan and Israel. See *Japan Times*, Dec. 13rd, 1994.
- 9) FACTS ON FILE (FOF), August 10th, 1990 [World News Digest with Index published weekly by Facts on File Inc. 460 Park Avenue South, New York, N. Y. 10016].
- 10) FOF August 10th, 1990.
- 11) FOF May 4th, 1990. FOF Dec. 19th 1986.
 By then Japan was accused of being involved of shipment of U. S. arms to Iran. Although Japanese foreign Minister Nakasone admitted that he had spoken with President Regan but he denied any role in the subsequent shipment of U. S. arms to Iran. Five years later Japan Aviation Electronic Industry Ltd. was convicted in a court in Tokyo of illegally exporting U. S. made missile components. The President and his officials were sentenced to prison and fined 5 million yen. See FOF April 30th, 1994.
- 12) FOF Sept. 16th, 1988 ; FOF Feb. 17, 1989.
- 13) FOF Sept. 4th, 1987.
- 14) President Regan blamed Germany and Japan in 1987 for not taking the initiative. Japan avoided the criticism by increasing the financial support to the American military presence in Japan and increasing its foreign aid to some Arab countries. See FOF Sept. 4th, 1987 ; FOF Sept. 7th, 1987.
- 15) Thomas M. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum : Japan's Culture of Anti Militarism," in *International Security* Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, p. 119.
- 16) Teab Saeed, *Role of Japan's Oil Industry and Emergence of Japan as a World Leader* (U. S. Hawaii University of Hawaii, PhD Dissertation, 1993).
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