# International Development: For Whom, and How? —— A Paradigmatic Investigation ——

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Background: Intent of the Paper

Despite the lapse of more than three decades ever since the promulgation of the United Nations Development Decade advocated by John F. Kennedy at the UN Assembly in 1961, the poverty still persists in many parts of the world. Despite notable progress in viable economic growth witnessed in East, South-east and even in South Asia to certain extent as well, the economic progress is beset, among other things, with two serious problems, namely, (1) the widening gap between the rich and the poor even in those fortuitous countries, with resultant emergence of frustrations on the part of the majority, and (2) the glaring levels of environmental disruption spreading over national borders.

In the meanwhile, as a result of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and a number of other centrally planned regimes in East Europe and elsewhere, the market economy is now considered the only societal instrument available for coping with all those nasty problems. Would it really be a feasible task?

The Graduate School of International Development (GSID) has given me one of the most challenging and exciting experiences in my professional career. Taking the opportunity of my retirement from it, an attempt is made to put forward a discussion on six key questions that would presumably constitute vital, if not exhaustive, cornerstones for the paradigm of international development. This paper should be regarded as the sequel (or the preamble, rather) to my earlier papers on the development management capability building published in the initial two volumes of *Journal of International Development Studies*. Readers are therefore requested to refer to those papers as well for understanding my entire conceptual framework. The present discussion is based on my research and education experience during my tenure of seven years at Nagoya University. While the topics discussed are submitted with my confidence about their importance, the discussion is as yet highly tentative and exploratory in nature. Accordingly, I earnestly hope that those questions be further pursued by, besides myself, those researchers and practitioners who may share my professional concerns: problem-solving in the real world.

# Question 1: Development for Whom?

With reference to Figure 1, a global perspective is presented in terms of two axes, viz. (1) population distribution between the advanced countries (AC) and Third World countries (TWC), and (2) three social classes viz. high income group (HIG), middle income group (MIG) and low income group (LIG). These three social classes should be construed not merely referring to the level of income, but also to the values and life styles associated with each group. Difference between rich and poor nations is viewed in terms of the relative magnitude of MIG, which by and large represents the urban middle class values and life styles of those engaged mostly in non-farm occupations. The entire discussion of this paper is based on the five assumptions noted below, keeping in view the three agenda, also noted below, in perspective.




Figure 1 Life Styles As Implied by Income Classes: A Global Perspective<sup>3)</sup>

# Assumption 1.

LIG still constitutes the majority of the global population, whose primary concerns still are the fulfillment of basic human needs such as the stable year-round supply of safe drinking water, of the firewood sufficient for cooking their daily food, the provision of primary health care, access to basic education and the freedom from discrimination and oppression;

#### Assumption 2.

For the time being, the majority of LIG reside in rural areas. However, as time goes on, a growing number of them are moving to urban areas and constitute what is called "the urban

poor." As a result, the incidence of poverty in urban areas is increasing in large part of the Third World;

#### Assumption 3.

The market economy, now considered as the only societal instrument for solving the problems of LIG, is constantly making inroads into the life of LIG, by way of spreading the urban middle class values and life styles as might be expediently represented by 3Cs——Coca Cola, Colour TV and Cars;

# Assumption 4.

The global environmental capacity and non-renewable natural resources presently available, economically as well as technically, would simply fail to enable all LIG to enjoy the same level of "wasteful" life styles of MIG as symbolized by 3C above; and

#### Assumption 5.

ODA and other technical and financial flows of development assistance being provided at present are largely negotiated between HIG-MIG collusive groups on the part of both AC and TWC. At this juncture, the colour of the skin and other features of cultural identity may not necessarily warrant that the HIG-MIG collusive groups of TWC can adequately represent the problems, needs and aspirations of LIG in their respective countries.

The inroads being made by MIG into LIG are inevitable anyway, for obvious reasons. At issue therefore is the extent to which, and the ways by which 1) we can "decelerate" the speed of Arrow Line A without jeopardizing the steady economic growth required for ameliorating the quality of life of LIG and, 2) we can operationalize the Arrow Line B in Figure 1 in an effective manner. Can such things be possible at all?

Accordingly, the core tasks of international development seem to revolve around three focal agenda submitted below :

# Agenda X:

In order to achieve the "Deceleration" objective above, we need a redressal of the life styles of MIG, primarily in the context of conserving environmental and non-renewable resources for the cause of sustainable development;

#### Agenda Y:

Second is the exploration of such sustainable development strategies as would improve the quality of life of LIG, while avoiding the 3C-styled consumption of environmental and non-renewable natural resources discussed above: and

#### Agenda Z:


As pointed out in Assumption 5 above, the needs and aspirations of LIG are only marginally reflected on international policy dialogue, even though the latter would have a decisive effect over the fate of LIG. The only right solution would be to strengthen the participation of LIG themselves in the decision-making process at international, national, subnational and community levels.

Presumably, there are no ready-made prescriptions that can guide us in the context of the three agenda. All what one can do would be to conceptualize a new system of thoughts based on careful examination of viable experiences being registered in the real world. In other words, the main line of further investigation should be *innovative and inductive*, while mobilizing to the fullest extent whatever knowledge and skills already available, unless deemed obsolete and useless.

# Question 2: Economic Growth vs. Environmental/Natural Resources Capacity

Figure 2 depicts a broad perspective with regard to the relation between the available amount of environmental and non-renewable resources (Hereinafter referred to as ENR, as represented by Curve A) and their consumption, represented by Curve B. The reason for indicating Curve A in the form of a step function is that the access to basic ENR such as coal,

Figure 2 Economic Growth vs. Environmental/Natural Non-Renewable Resources



iron, oil or nuclear energy has been made possible through incidences of discovery and technological innovation, meaning that the increase in accessible ENR has been realized in somewhat discontinuous manner.

In the meanwhile, the consumption of ENR by human society has been increasing in a contiguous manner, owing primarily to two essential trends: the increase in world population and the increase in per capita consumption of ENR concomitant with economic growth. The double circled point P connotes the present position of our society. Should we follow the current trend of ENR consumption, there is a danger that we may before long exceed the total amount of accessible ENR, meaning an environmental/resource crisis. The ominous expansion of the Ozone hole around the South Pole would be a typical case in point.

Presumably, one can conceive of five major options as means to cope with the potential crisis. First is of course to raise the ceiling of Curve A by way of succeeding in technological breakthrough such as the peaceful use of nuclear fusion, as denoted by option-I in Figure 2. Such an option may permit us, at least for the time being, to continue the present "wasteful" ENR consumption performance.

Second is to succeed in a series of technological innovation for energy saving, for example, invention of new engines for motor cars with extremely low consumption. With reference to Figure 2, this option means a less steep upward rise of Curve B on a global scale, which is in fact being accomplished to a notable extent in case of technologically advanced countries like Japan.<sup>4)</sup>

The third option would be to transform our life styles in such a way that not only the upward trend of Curve B be made less steep, but also the rightward movement of Curve B itself (i. e. progress of economic growth) be slowed down, particularly with regard to that of AC (advanced countries). Such a redressal in the life style may be brought about if we succeed in transforming the value orientation of LIGs —— towards higher appreciation of non-material amenities rather than the endless pursuit of material affluence.

No doubt, the forthcoming tidal wave of demand for material consumption will be from some of TWC such as East Asian and ASEAN nations, rather than AC (i. e. present-day industrialized nations). Nonetheless, to be realistic, what can be hoped for in this regard would be the moral leadership and demonstration effect originating from within AC. It would be unrealistic to advocate less material-oriented life style to MIG and a large part of LIG in TWC — who are already no more than a reserve force of MIG! We must recall how keen we Japanese once upon a time were for buying an electric washer, a refrigerator, a TV set, a car, so and so forth.

As a matter of fact, the redressal and new value orientation toward non-material well-being are already surfacing in a variety of forms in AC and, to certain extent in TWC

as well, where there still exist strong religious traditions. At issue therefore is to explore feasible strategies for facilitating the spread of those emerging trends. Role of education and mass media will be particularly important in this regard.

Such an advocacy may meet serious objections from those TWC which are vehemently pursuing export promotion strategies as the main leverage for uplifting their economies, for the policy emphasizing less material well-being strategy may result in the reduction of import capacities of AC, and therefore the shrinkage of international trade and ultimately, therefore, the "stall" of their economic growth. To certain extent, such a downward trend would be an unavoidable fate to be borne by all in as fair manner as possible. However, we should not overlook the fact that an advanced country like Japan does have a tremendous scope for sustained demand for goods and services in the coming years. A lot needs to be done for improving their housing conditions, sewerage systems, humane care for the aged citizens, so and so forth. What we need is a redressal from wasteful to more sustainable type of socioeconomic structure. Japanese, for example, do need better houses, better care for aging compatriots, but *not* so many watches, clothes rarely worn, or luxurious cars of high consumption.

Meanwhile, some economists may argue that the problem of dwindling resources should not be used as the pretext for decelerating economic growth, for the scarcity of certain factors will raise their prices, so that their rational utilization should be best taken care of through free market mechanism. They may thus contend that the advocacy for deceleration of economic growth is a totally irrelevant proposition. They may further argue: the disappearance of oil resources was worried about even half a century ago. Ever since that time, technological innovations have always successfully broadened the resource frontier: why not in the future as well, if we are to be "objective and scientific"?

Presumably, such an argument fails to realize the fact that the everlasting increase in energy consumption has now started affecting the global environmental capacity, as demonstrated by the Ozone hole, the climatic change (i. e. Earth warming) and the like. I for one would like to submit that the exploration of possibilities for deceleration of economic growth should be given serious consideration, at least as *one* of most crucial tasks of international development. Acid rains have already started destroying the forest in both Japan and Korean Peninsula. Can free market system successfully take care of the pollution control of a huge nation with over 1.2 billion population without getting too late? The message of the Club of Rome made in early seventies should be reviewed under a new light.

The fourth option is the enhancement of social justice, particularly in terms of the most fundamental asset for production for majority of TWC population: *land*. As stressed in the recent World Bank publication, the success of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, China in viable

development owes a great deal to the far-reaching agrarian reform carried out in those economies.<sup>5)</sup>

When the land remains in the hands of the few, the central concern of the few is to avoid reduction of prices of their farm produce. Their central motive is the profit maximization, rather than production maximization. It would be fair to assume therefore that the more equally the land is distributed, the higher the total output is likely to be. Higher farm production is crucial for not only being one of most essential fuels for industrialization and modernization of economies but also, at a more fundamental level, for securing food supply for growing population. The encroachment of forest in TWC is caused primarily because of shortage of land to till by poor peasants. On that score, the enhancement of social justice by way of effective agrarian reform, very closely relates to the ENR conservation.

The fifth and last option, never the least, is of course the deceleration of population growth. While the importance of this option is felt almost obvious and does not require any further elaboration, the discussion at the World Population Summit held last September '94 at Cairo, Egypt was quite turbulent. To make things worse, the effect of any changes in the trend of population growth, if at all, can be brought about with considerable time lag—say, half a century later.

To sum up, two points would have to be stressed. First, all the five options are not mutually exclusive, so that all of them need to be combined for maximizing their concerted effect. Second, of the five options, those of purely scientific nature are two only: Option I and II. All the rest involve economic, social, ethical, cultural and even political (e. g. agrarian reform) dimensions. This fact presents another strong case for justifying the need for integrated, that is, interdisciplinary approaches for managing international development.

#### Question 3: Growth vs. Equity<sup>7)</sup>

Needless to say, the poverty has been, and will be one of the central problems of development. However, it could have been felt much less acute if everybody on Earth were equally poor. It is in fact the *inequality* between the rich and the poor that really bothers us. Inequality exists in many ways, for example: amongst countries, social classes within a country, subnational regions within a country, between the well-educated and the less educated, those skilled and those unskilled, so and so forth. Of all these, the inequality amongst social classes and that amongst subnational regions would be more fundamental in the context of integrated development.

Everyone engaged in development must as least once have heard about the Kuznets Curve, meaning that the inequality tends to rise up to a certain stage of economic growth. It is only

after an economy reaching a certain level of per capita income that the degree of inequality amongst social classes starts to decline. Thus the level of inequality constitutes an "Inverse-U" curve relative to the level of per capita income.

However, owing to the difficulty of obtaining reliable time series data of poor countries, the Kuznets Curve was originally put forward through *inference* based on cross-sectional data comparing the social class inequality status amongst countries.<sup>8)</sup> However, according to a recent book of J. G. Williamson based on empirical long-term time series data available in several Western nations,<sup>9)</sup> it is advanced that, while the inequality-convergence trend after reaching certain levels of economic growth is clearly observable through empirical data, there is considerable divergence of empirical data with regard to the earlier stages of economic development, meaning that the inequality-rising trend advanced by Kuznets is not necessarily borne out empirically.

The classical work of J. G. Williamson on interregional income inequality was made along similar veins. Also through *inference* made from cross-sectional data amongst countries, Williamson put forward another Inverse–U hypothesis that the interregional income inequality first rose up to certain stage of economic growth, then declined after reaching a higher stage of growth. There is a study by Lo and Kamal using empirical time series data of Japan, demonstrating the validity of the Inverse–U hypothesis of Williamson.<sup>10)</sup>

As pointed out at the outset of this section, if it is the inequality that really matters rather than poverty *per se*, the series of analysis on the relation between growth and equity very briefly reviewed above seem to pose for us several profound questions about the ways by which the development process be managed, particularly in the case of countries at early stages of economic development —— i. e., those that may presumably be under the inequality-rising domain of the Inverse-U curve.

In this connexion, *World Development Report 1990* (Hereafter *WDR '90*) of the World Bank, a special issue on poverty, put forward a striking proposition. According to my own expression, it appears to spread a new gospel: *Good-bye, Kuznets Curve*. In order to support their contentions, Table 1 is advanced.

It is pointed out that the long-term actual poverty reduction performance in countries like Colombia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, has been quite favourable. Furthermore, although the rate of poverty did not significantly decline in countries like India or Sri Lanka, *WDR'* 90 argues that such trends have proven that the inequality has tended to decline, so that the data lent no support to the long-believed Inverse-U Kuznets Curve.<sup>11)</sup>

The hastiness with which the argument is advanced is startling. The figures referred to in the column of "Simulated reduction in poverty" is explained as computed on the assumption that "the inequality of income remains unchanged" (Footnote b). In the first place, I must

Table 1 Poverty, economic growth, and recession

country and period	Length of period (years)	Observed reduction in poverty a (percentage points)	Simulated reduction in poverty b (percentage points)	Annual growth of mean income of expenditure (percent)
Long-run growth				
Indonesia ('70-'87)	17	41	35	3.4
Thailand ('62-'86)	24	33	30	2.7
Pakistan ('62-'84)	22	31	26	2.2
Brazil ('60-'80)	20	29	34	5.1
Malaysia ('73-'87)	14	23	19	4.0
Singapore ('72-'82)	10	21	19	6.4
Costa Rica ('71-'86)	15	21	22	3.5
Colombia ('71-'88)	17	16	8	1.1
India ('72-'83)	11	11	10	1.0
Sri Lanka ('63-'82)	19	10	8	0.9
Morocco ('70-'84)	14	9	1	0.2
Short-term recession				
Costa Rica ('83-'86)	3	12	13	10.9
Indonesia ('84-'87)	3	11	9	5.0
India ('77-'83)	6	7	2	0.8
Malaysia ('84-'87)	3	1	-1	-0.7
Pakistan ('79-'84)	5	1	4	1.2
Colombia ('78-'88)	10	-1	-1	-1.2
Côte d'Ivoire ('85-'86)	1	-1	-5	-5.4
China ('85-'88)c	3	-4	5	6.7
Brazil ('81-'87)	6	-5	1	0.9
Venezuela ('82-'87)	5	-5	-6	-4.5
Thailand ('81-'86)	5	-6	0	0.0
Costa Rica ('77-'83)	6	-7	-8	-3.4
Yugoslavia ('78-'87)	9	-7	-12	-2.9
Poland ('78-'87)	9	-14	-17	-1.2

 $<sup>{\</sup>tt a}$  . Absolute change in the headcount index on the basis of the definition of absolute poverty in the specific country.

Source: WDR '90, op. cit. p. 48.

point out that no details are provided in the Report about the ways by which they measured the *inequality*. Secondly, the "observed reduction in poverty," which is explained as "Absolute change in the head count on the basis of the definition of absolute poverty in the specific country" (Footnote a), can happen *regardless* of whether the level of inequality might have risen or declined, particularly on the part of higher income classes. Indeed, contending for the reduction of inequality by comparing the two columns is too partial to be convincing. In

b. The simulation assumes that the inequality of income remains unchanged.

c. Rural only.

fact, the Bank is mixing two arguments: one on the incidence of poverty and the other, on inequality. How can one objectively argue that the inequality has declined by simply pointing out that the number of those under poverty line did not increase significantly, without referring to what happened to the higher income classes? If the inequality of the latter has significantly risen, and that very much appears to be the case in many situations, the contention of *WDR* '90 is misleading.

Secondly, the discrepancy between short- and long-term poverty reduction performances of some countries such as Thailand and Pakistan is intriguing. The changes (i. e. percentage points) of the indicator employed as the basis of the argument are not significantly large. All the periods covered by their "long-term" analysis include early seventies when the repeated oil crisis shook the whole world, thus causing profound transformation in the socio-economic structure of most countries. In particular, the progress of urbanization during the past ten to twenty years needs to be noted. In fact a sizable number of the poor in rural areas moved to urban areas during the period, so that their nominal level of income must have increased simply because of higher cost of living in urban areas, thus adding to the reduction of "headcounts in poverty incidence," without any meaningful improvement in terms of their actual quality of life. Unless the poverty line is differentiated between urban and rural areas, the long range comparison would be of little meaning.

As mentioned earlier, the Bank does not reveal the analytical basis upon which they have examined the nexus between the incidence of poverty and the degree of inequality. However, even swallowing their hypothesis, the short-term data cited in the lower part of Table 1 do not appear at all to lend any support to their *Good-bye, Kuznets Curve* assertion.

Presumably, it would be fair to admit that the short term data might be more immune from the disturbances of the socioeconomic transformation pointed out above than long-term data. Of the 13 cases cited therein (again, the background for the selection of 13 is not clarified either), seven register negative growth performance. In those negative growth cases, if the "Observed reduction in poverty" registers higher degree of poverty reduction than "Simulated reduction" rate, the case should be construed as validating Kuznets Curve hypothesis, not "Good-bye, Kuznets." As a matter of fact, all the negative growth cases therefore undermine the Bank's contentions, or demonstrate neutral results (Colombia and Costa Rica). It is only one case of India that lends support to the Bank.

In this connexion, an empirical study conducted by Dr. IKEMOTO Yukio of Kyoto University seems to provide a useful clue for deeper understanding of what is all about.<sup>12)</sup> Making use of far more detailed empirical data such as (1) Income distribution by per capita household income (1975-88), (2) Poverty incidence during '81-88 with five (subnational) regional breakdowns, (3) Distribution of households of higher income class in terms of per

Table 2 Income Distribution by Per Capita Household Income

	1975	1981	1986	1988
Top quintile	49.3	51.5	55.6	55.0
Highest top decile	33.4	35.4	39.2	37.9
Second top decile	15.9	16.0	16.5	17.1
2nd quintile	21.0	20.6	19.9	20.3
3rd quintile	14.0	13.4	12.1	12.2
4th quintile	9.7	9.1	7.9	8.0
Bottom quintile	6.1	5.4	4.6	4.5
Second bottom decile	3.6	3.3	2.8	2.7
Lowest bottom decile	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.8
Gini Coefficient	0.426	0.453	0.500	0.478

Source: Hutaserani and Tapwong 1990: 8a Quoted in Ikemoto, op. cit. p. 214

capita household income by regions ('81-'86-'88), (4) Distribution of households of higher income classes in terms of per capita household income by occupation of household head ('86-'88), (5) Average household income by occupation of household head ('86-'88), (6) Distribution of national income and so on, he has demonstrated a multi-faceted empirical evidence, for example:

- 1. Interregional income gap amongst five major regions increased during '81-'88 and furthermore, Gini Coefficient of each region also registered significant rise;
- 2. During the period '75-'88, the income distribution by per capita household income indicates considerable rise in the inequality as shown in Table 2 above.

The overall perspective that seems to transpire from the above table indicates a similar trend to the short-term performance of the *WDR '90* table quoted earlier, lending no support to "Good-bye Kuznets Curve" gospel.

Keeping all these in view, I would like to submit a serious doubt against the sweeping generalization advanced in the *WDR '90*. As aptly demonstrated by Ikemoto, the development performance is analogous to a kaleidoscope. In most of the Third World nations undergoing rapid structural transformation from predominantly rural to predominantly urban economy, income gap between people in cities and villages will unavoidably increase. Even in city itself, the income gap between so-called "new urban elites" and others will also inevitably increase. Detailed empirical data quoted in the Ikemoto paper seem to lend support to all these common-sensical observations.

The formulation of development policies and planning, the identification, formulation and implementation of various development actions should be managed in order to attend to those various facets of the development process. I am tempted to question the motive behind the sweeping generalizations of World Bank: *Good-bye Kuznets Curve*. Is it not their hidden

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intent to divert the attention of readers from the negative consequences of economic growth inevitably taking place in a number of corners of the Third World? If not, such an argument should have been submitted with much more broad-based empirical analyses. No doubt, income inequality may be declining in certain regions or countries. Nonetheless, simplistic assertions in favour of economic growth would lead us to nowhere, except abortive and misleading conclusions. In fact, if World Bank really wanted to challenge the Kuznets Curve, it should have started their analysis simply with using the same measurement criterion as employed by Kuznets: the income accruing to the *top 20%* of all population in each country. Were there any particular reasons for averting it?

# Question 4: Women in Development<sup>13)</sup>

In the context of development thoughts, the 1970s is remembered as a shining decade, wherein the concept of equity, social justice and so on were stressed in parallel with the progress of institution-building for development management particularly in the Asian region. Promulgation of the International Decade of Women (1975–85) of the United Nations, the advocacy of Basic Human Needs by ILO at the World Employment Conference of 1976 are salient manifestations of such trends.

However, its reversal was true of the 1980s. In order to stem further aggravation of the accumulating debt problem that plagued many poor countries particularly those in Africa and Latin America, the so-called Structural Adjustment Initiative was relentlessly imposed by IMF and World Bank over the heavily indebted nations. No doubt, such an initiative had much to do with the catastrophe of centrally planned states that led to the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its East European allies towards the end of eighties. Rightly or wrongly, there was an upheaval in the confidence in the free market system.

Consequently, it was in fact towards the advent of 1990s that the plights of those marginalized in the process of ruthless enforcement of macroeconomic adjustment policies started drawing serious attention of various quarters at national and international levels. Poverty alleviation was put up as one of four principal development strategies for 1990s of the United Nations together with 1) economic growth 2) human resources development and 3) environmental conservation. The deepening of the awareness of the problems of women as one of the principal marginalized groups in the process of development is certainly parallel to such concerns.

C. N. Moser, one of proliferate proponents in women-development related questions advanced five typologies for classifying the relevant policies pursued since 1950s and 60s, namely: 1) Welfare Approach, 2) Equity Approach, 3) Anti-Poverty Approach, 4)

Efficiency Approach and 5) Empowerment Approach.<sup>15)</sup>

Presumably it was only too natural that the concern with the deprived status of women first took shape of welfare approach during 1950-60s such as food aid, malnutrition countermeasures, family planning and so on. Women were seen as passive object to be relieved, with emphasis on their *reproductive* (bearing and rearing children, attending to household chores, etc.) roles. In some cases, the approach caused further dependence of women, rather than their self-reliance, and also further burden on women by mobilizing them for *productive* (activities for earning income) activities.

The approaches classified as Equity, Anti-poverty and Efficiency were brought to the fore during 1970s in resonance with the social justice-oriented wind currents during the decade mentioned earlier. The Equity approach focused on the mitigation of inequalities between men and women in sharing the fruit of development, thus forming the original mould of the WID concept (Women in Development). The approach was crystallized in several legislations for protecting equal rights of women through top-down initiative of governments.

Following the Equity approach wherein the existing economic system of our society was accepted as given, the Anti-Poverty approach had a sharper focus on women in poor countries. Women were considered important actors in meeting the requirement of basic human needs, recognizing that women's disadvantages were primarily caused by their lack in the access to the basic assets for production: land and capital. The approach aimed at mobilizing women for gainful employment and other productive activities. As a result, it was unavoidable to cause excessive work burden over women —— for nothing was done for reducing their duties in reproductive activities.

The Efficiency approach attempted to enhance women's productive capability. Thus finally, the focus of the approach "shifted from women and towards development itself". It would be fair to assume, as a result, that the four approaches very briefly reviewed above put forward operational principles for improving the status of women within the context of existing socio-economic structure.

The fifth and last approach, the Empowerment approach, squarely questions structural gender inequality in the first place. Taniguchi writes:<sup>17)</sup>


"Unlike the Equity approach, however, it (i. e., Empowerment approach) identifies power not in terms of the domination by one group over others, but in terms of the capacity of women to increase their own self-reliance and internal strength. In a sense, the concept of power in the Equity approach is quantitative while it is qualitative in case of the Empowerment approach."

Accordingly, the strengthening of women's bargaining power in the participatory process

at the grass-root level is stressed in this approach. It no longer confines itself within the realm of income enhancement. Women's participation in the political decision-making process is brought to the fore in the perspective. As a result, women's question is now made an integral part of empowering a variety of marginalized and/or vulnerable groups in the development process. The Empowerment approach looks upon women no longer as the object of spoon-feeding and benevolence. They are seen as one of powerful actors to bring about social, cultural as well as political changes to each society concerned, wherein the gender inequality has been entrenched over long period of time.

However, a perpetual question for us all is to what extent and in what ways the men and the women should be *different*. It is in fact the difference between the two sexes that fascinates men with women and vice versa. Yet it is nonetheless true that the gender discrimination certainly exists between the two sexes not only in poor countries but in industrialized countries like Japan. There exist significant gaps in the level of adult illiteracy between male and female. Obviously, such gaps are caused not by biological difference but by social factors. Other examples abound in a number of societies. Accordingly, the Figure  $3^{18}$  would be pertinent for conceptualizing the nexus between the two basic domains.

Figure 3 Nexus between Gender Bias and Biological Difference between Two Sexes.



In most cultural milieus, women have been responsibile for reproductive works of all kinds. As a result, women's access to productive work has been, more often than not, degenerated relative to that of men. Although Figure 3 conceptually clarifies the nexus between the two concepts, actual demarcation —— identifying the location of a certain concrete activity in Figure 3 —— is extremely difficult.

Meanwhile, as impressively put forward by Taniguchi in her somewhat lengthy concluding remarks titled "Perplexity", we must avoid by all means the fallacy of imposing the gender paradigm of modern societies over less developed cultural environment. Unscrupulous attempt of applying modern principles of gender equality over tradition-bound society will certainly ruin, rather than ameliorate, the society in question.

G. Becker, a prominent Nobel Prize lauriate neoclassical economist, clearly advances his proposition about women. Women have cultivated, through long history of male-female *division* of labour, the aptitude of various kinds mostly suited to preproductive activities, for which he uses the word *capability*. The aptitude thus developed over time has formed even

*preference* on the part of women towards activities of such types. Becker thus contends that the rational allocation of (human) resources in a household is to let men undertake productive and women, reproductive activities.<sup>19)</sup>

As a statement of the fact, Becker's view above can be supported by a number of evidence. However, so long as gender researchers are keen to question the very socio-cultural background that has brought about such women's *capability* (patience to look after mischievous children, dexterousness for embroidery etc., besides biological capability like bearing a child and lactation) and *preference* of women themselves, the neoclassical viewpoint does not shed any light for gender researchers.

What can we do then, after all? Commensurate with one of the most fundamental principles of the development paradigm today that the situation-specific values and preferences of any social groups should be fully respected, then the division of functions shared between men and women may also have to be respected, so long as the both sexes are complacent with it.

However, at this juncture, the point raised by A. K. Sen would have to be considered.<sup>20)</sup> According to Sen, women, owing to their weaker bargaining power (caused by their remoteness to productive activities) within the household, women tend to get less cognizant of their self worth, and may develop the sense of altruism instead. As a result, Sen asserts, that women's discriminated position should be recognized even though women themselves may be complacent with their life style as is, and may not explicitly speak out about their own problems. This assertion represents another fundamental principle of development: elimination of discrimination in all situations.

Keeping both of these contentions in perspective, what a development specialist can and should do will boil down to one thing: carefully monitor changes that may be explicitly or implicitly taking place in a socio-cultural environment, and encourage those changes which are considered favourable and discourage those unfavourable, from the viewpoint of removing gender discrimination. That is, a *selective facilitation* of welcomed changes. Needless to say, the selection exercise of the favourable changes should be made through frank and conducive dialogue within community people themselves.

#### Question 5: Planning for Employment in Urban Informal Sector.

Generation and well-balanced diffusion of employment opportunities over national space, thereby mitigating various negative consequences deriving from concentration of population and activities into large metropolitan regions, has long been one of the crucial objectives of development planning at national and subnational levels of countries in the Third World.

However, the results have largely been a failure for several reasons.

Presumably, one of important reasons for the failure is that the analyses concerning employment have primarily depended on the establishment surveys which in most cases leave out workers engaged in small scale units and own-account workers, despite the fact that the workers in those categories constitutes as large as 60% in case of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 40-66% in Asia during the 1980s in total urban employment profiles.<sup>21)</sup>

No doubt, those small-scale business workers and own-account workers have been enumerated in the residential surveys such as population censuses. However, in this case, their sectoral breakdowns are mostly missing. As a result, it is virtually impossible to establish an interface between conventional development planning — which is essentially based on intersectional analytical framework — and the total employment profile embracing the workers in small scale units and own-account workers (who are often referred to as informal sector workers), despite their magnitude in the entire urban employment.

Keeping in view the prevailing state of the art briefly outlined above, I once initiated a cross-national comparative study on urban informal sector employment in collaboration with knowledgeable researchers in five countries in Asia (India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand) as well as a senior expert who has long been in the forefront of the informal sector employment studies of ILO (International Labour Organization) Geneva, with two principal objectives in mind.

First is to explore possibilities of making the development planning at national and subnational levels more meaningful, by way of introducing employment planning that can embrace the urban informal sector components in its analytical framework. The second objective is to find out clues for improving statistical data collection system in Third World nations, in such a way that it will contribute better for the attainment of the first objective.

#### a. Informal sector: Definitional Issues

The so-called Informal Sector (Hereinafter abbreviated as IFS) does involve illegal connotations. For example, vending on the street, which is a typical IFS business, is considered illegal in many countries. A number of IFS workers may receive payment lower than the amount statutorily defined as minimum wage, or work longer than the hours also statutorily defined working hours without being properly paid for the overtime work. In these regards, a considerable segment of IFS workers are working —— or, obliged to work in "illegal" manners.

However, they should not be confused with those illegal workers who are consciously engaged in business of criminal nature, such as narcotics transactions, smuggling of arms, prostitution etc., causing obvious detrimental effect on the society, although these criminal

business may constitute a fraction in the IFS as a whole.<sup>22)</sup> There is a general agreement in this regard all through the country studies conducted this time. As a result, it would be fair to assume that the definition of IFS as commonly put forward and widely accepted in the international community is also applicable to all those studies. An example of such a definition is cited as follows:<sup>23)</sup>

"... very small-scale units producing and distributing foods and services, and consisting largely of independent, self-employed producers in urban areas of developing countries, some of whom also employ family labour and/or a few hired workers or apprentices; which operate with very little capital, or none at all; which utilise a low level of technology and skills; which therefore operate at a low level of productivity; and which generally provide very low and irregular incomes and highly unstable employment to those who work in it..."

The above is quite in line with the definition initially put forward in the classical ILO report on IFS in Kenya in 1972.<sup>24)</sup>

#### b. IFS Performance: Statistical Evidence

In case of our study in Indonesia, Myanmar and Philippines, the quantitative magnitude of IFS had to be analyzed mainly through either broad macroeconomic figures or conjectures based on situation-specific micro studies of primarily anthropological nature. Many of the figures reported are striking. Although the bases of computation is not clearly indicated, an estimation is introduced that the rate of contribution of IFS in the total GNP of the Philippines once exceeded 60% in the year 1985, when the country underwent traumatic political transition from Marcos to Aquino administrations. Even years thereafter until 1988, the rate still continued to be as high as in the neighbourhood of 50%. As regards the share of IFS in total employment profile (i. e., including both urban and rural), it is about 50% in the case of Philippines<sup>25)</sup> and as high as 77% in case of Indonesia.<sup>26)</sup> In case of Thailand, the figure is even higher, viz. 86% as of 1988.<sup>27)</sup> However these figures include not only urban but rural IFS workers as well, so that these figures are not readily comparable with those introduced in the ILO Report quoted earlier.

In case of India and Thailand, statistical data compilation is at a little more advanced stage, although there are different kinds of drawbacks. In case of India, the data collection pertaining to what is termed as "Unorganized Sector" (largely synonymous with IFS) has been sustained longer than past three decades. Over that long period, various classification categories applied have undergone changes so that many of those data do not allow detailed time trend analyses.

In case of Thailand, although the categories are quite broad (i. e. manufacturing sector units and trade-services sector units), the survey in all unit-sizes has been undertaken.

However, the comparable data are available only after mid-seventies and furthermore, on account of the different samples employed for industrial units and trade-services units, their respective magnitudes are not readily comparable.

Nonetheless, useful empirical evidences seem to emerge. For example, if we compare the growth of "unorganized sector" employment during 1979–1985 for the whole India, the rate of increase is from 14, 342 to 32, 239 thousand, meaning an increase of 126%. According to the United Nations statistical report, the population increase during the same period was 23% (from 660 to 812 millions), and the increase in the formal manufacturing sector employment was merely 6% (from 5, 849 to 6, 183 thousands).<sup>28)</sup>

The extremely high rate of labour absorption in the unorganized urban industrial sector is no doubt the result of not only the population pressure but that of accelerated urbanization. Anyway, the poor rate of employment absorption in the formal industrial sector is striking. Note should be made, however, to a remark made by Kundu that the rate of increase in terms of the number of "unorganized" urban industrial units during the same period was higher (150% from 1, 906 to 4, 779 thousand units), than the increase in employment (i.e., 126%). Kundu argues, based on this evidence that the labour absorptive capacity of urban industrial IFS is declining.<sup>29)</sup>

In case of Thailand, it is interesting to note that, according to the projection made by the government, a significant decline in the growth rate of IFS employment is foreseen vi-à-vis a steady rise in the growth rate of the formal sector employment. However, our Thai report argues that "Despite the increasing importance of the formal sector in the future, the IFS will remain to be vital in the next decade....".

The above is a projection, so that it remains to be seen whether it will come true or not. If we make a rough conjecture using the data made available, the share of formal firms (assuming for the time being that the Medium-and Large-size firms represent the formal sector) in fact registered steady increase except the last year 1984 (78% in 1977, 80% in 1979, 83% in 1982, and 78% in 1984). It may therefore be plausible to say that the above-mentioned government projection is not totally unrealistic. Caution should however be made about the fact that whatever picture that may emerge from the report, it is no more than partial, apart from sampling errors.

In view of the findings pointed out above, in would be fair to distill the following conclusions in terms of the importance of IFS in the total employment profile:

- i ) All the five country reviews seem to validate, even in Asia under significant economic growth trend, that the share of IFS in the total urban employment is quite sizable, and
- ii) As somewhat supported by empirical data available particularly in India and Thailand, while the magnitude of IFS employment remains important, its relative share is going to

decline gradually.

#### c. Other Matters of Relevance

Besides the basic points reviewed in the foregoing, there are a number of interesting evidences and insightful observations put forward in all the country reviews. Of these, the complementary relationships between formal and informal sectors pointed out in the Indian report would deserve attention. Kundu argues that, by observing that the household manufacturing type units have grown rapidly in larger towns which, by implication, have higher concentration of formal manufacturing units.

Owing to the paucity of statistical information, area-specific analysis of such a nature is not attempted in other country reviews (As a matter of fact, the formal-informal complementary relationships have been ascertained through micro studies).<sup>30)</sup> In this connexion, some of the findings made in: "A Preliminary Study on Graduation of Informal Sector Activities" by Maung Maung Lwin also seems to reveal corroborative evidence.<sup>31)</sup>

With reference to the field study in Bangkok on GMS units (Garment Manufacturing Shophouse) conducted in August 1992, the source of capital is found that, while the capital was drawn invariably from informal sources at the outset, 15% of the respondents have already availed themselves of formal bank loans for business expansion, and 50% are willing to tap formal bank loans. Furthermore, 25% rely on the *mother firms*. As a result, it is only no more than 10% of all respondents who continue to depend on informal capital sources *only*. These evidences appear to connote two important facts: First, many small businesses usually classified as IFS are already viable enough to be able to borrow money from formal sources and second: close relation between "mother" firms and subcontracting firms. Such a situation contrasts with other cases like India, wherein "the availability of banking finance is minimal."

Another point is the so-called "graduation" question, the main theme of Maung Maung Lwin paper, op. cit.. Not only in terms of the source of capital, several other dimensions are pointed out as implying relatively smooth transition from informal to formal categories.

Methodological concerns with regard to the planning for employment consists of two principal substantive domains. First is to view the planning for employment as an integral part of macroscopic development planning. To be more concrete, it means a search for identifying a multiplier or coefficient that can serve as the interface between macroplanning framework (i. a. capital investment and its intersectoral resource allocation) and the employment generation including IFS components, keeping in view both short and long-range time frame.

Second is addressed to the search for effective as well as feasible package of policy

actions conductive to the strengthening of economic viability of micro-enterprises and own-account workers, as well as to the improvement of their working conditions and quality of life in general, particularly from the viewpoint of meeting basic human needs of people involved in IFS employment. Accordingly various kinds of institutional arrangements particularly those which can ensure that the needs and aspirations of people at the grass-root level be fully incorporated in the development plan, those being the main target of any plans.

With regard to both of the above, "Employment Planning in the Urban Informal Sector" by S. V. Sethuraman provides very useful guidelines.<sup>32)</sup> The chapter contains a critical review on manpower planning and human resources planning. Manpower planning is essentially an exercise for identifying the gap between 1) skilled manpower presently available in the society in question, and 2) skilled manpower deemed necessary for ensuring successful implementation of a development plan.

In the meanwhile, Sethuraman writes that "the human resource planning differs from the manpower planning approach in that the former deals with the allocation of scarce resource for human capital formation."

Both approaches seem to have serious drawbacks to be a meaningful instrument for planning. The chapter provides a succinct account of general crucial factors that have caused failure. Sethuraman quotes: "... manpower forecasts based on manpower requirement approach have turned out to be wildly inaccurate." Crucial weakness was that both manpower planning and human resource planning failed to take technological changes into consideration. In addition, the market imperfections (e. g., labour of equal quality is not necessarily rewarded equally, etc.) make the approach largely unrealistic. The inability of the approach to incorporate structural changes in the economy is another factor that has led to its weakness.

In any event, those conventional approaches are totally irrelevant and unappreciable to the employment in IFS. Sethuraman points out that the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO), which provides the basis for the classification of labour force by occupations is applicable to formal sector only. It fails to reflect miscellaneous occupations found in IFS.

As regards the second type of the employment planning approach, that is, identification of a policy package instrumental to the improvement of both economic and social status of IFS workers, Sethuraman presents an articulate list of the elements to be taken into consideration, such as the provision of credit facilities, improving access to training for technological upgrading, improvement of infrastructures (including premises particularly in inner city locations), and so on.

As regards the first approach, viz. the effort of linking IFS employment to the overall

framework of development planning, the two annexes added to his paper highlighting various problems pertaining to data collection on IFS are insightful indeed. Keeping in view the number of valuable suggestions contained in the main body of the Sethuraman's paper as well as the two annexes, my concluding observation is put forward as follows.

- 1. Although noticeable effort is being made in some countries to strengthen the statistical data base embracing the IFS components, the territorial framework in accordance with which the data are complied are too broad. For example, in case of India, the state-wise data are divided into urban and rural categories only. Depending upon the scale of a town, the structure of inherent problems and potentials can be very different. In case of Thailand, while the job classifications, etc. are fairly detailed, the data are complied by urban and rural part of the nation as a whole. This means that the significant socioeconomic difference that apparently exists between Bangkok metropolitan region and other provincial township areas cannot be taken into consideration;
- 2. It is my strong conviction that for the development planning to be a meaningful guideline for identifying most crucial needs and problems, for incorporating those needs and problems into workable programmes and projects, and for spelling out required actions for effective implementation management, the subnational disaggregation of the national macroscopic planning framework is absolutely necessary. It therefore follows that there should be a corresponding data base that can support such an exercise at relevant subnational levels;
- 3. As pointed out earlier, there are two major approaches for data collection, viz. residential survey and establishment survey. Although Sethuraman suggests that both should be combined for obtaining needed information, I am inclined to stress the importance of the residential survey approach for several reasons. First, it would be a safer approach for avoiding double counts (In view of the prevailing situation that quite a few people may have more than one job —— sometimes one in formal and others in the informal sector, or two or more in IFS only). Second, any analytical exercise dealing with IFS should not leave out women and children, many of whom tend to work at home. Establishment approach would be more vulnerable to sampling errors in this regard.

Commonly recognized drawback of residential survey is the inaccuracy of the answers concerning the size and types of the firm to which the respondent belongs. However, by way of employing simple and broad categories about the scale of operation, the errors deriving from unreliability is expected to remain within a tolerable range;

4. We would definitely need to apply a job classification category suitable to IFS work types, in such a way that its reclassification commensurate with ISCO can somehow be managed at a later stage. In this connexion, the experience of Thailand may deserve our

attention. Although there are both industrial survey (covering manufacturing units only) and Service and Trade Sector Survey, the results are not comparable owing to the difference in the sampling base. Consequently, the relative proportion between the two, even at a very broad level, is not obtainable despite tremendous time and resources spent for the two statistical operations. All types of urban IFS should be surveyed under unified sampling framework. Job classification can start in a very broad manner, just like the case of Thailand: (1) manufacturing and (2) trade and services.

5. Finally, we may have to go back to the very genesis of IFS questions, viz. its definition. As far as its qualitative definition is concerned, a sensible consensus seems to have already been established, as quoted in the early part of this section.

However, in actual statistical data compilation, the size of the firm seems to be the only criterion employed for measurement in all the countries reviewed this time, and it seems to be the case for all other countries as well.

The further we study about IFS, the more we are made aware of the fact that there is an extreme diversity within IFS itself. Hence, if we were able to identify *major subcategories* within IFS, there is a possibility that the task of "planning for employment including IFS components," which is the very original objective of this study, can be tackled in a more operationally meaningful manner.

Following such a reasoning, as a matter of example, three categories may be conceivable. First is those type of small-scale businesses already operating with considerable level of skills, technology and productivity, and expected to transform in due course to an integral part of the formal sector (e. g. small-scale manufacturing, repair or retail services); second is those petty traders selling food items, flowers, cigarettes etc. on the street, largely based on unskilled labour, which will sooner or later disappear in accordance with the process of economic modernization; and third is those types of jobs constituting the subsidiary end of formal facilities, such as janitors and porters working at airport or train stations, or women engaged in domestic services for higher or middle income households, of which increase and decrease may be directly manipulable by public policies with regard to wage regulation, introduction of mechanization and so on. In fact, IFS has been conceived as a generic concept comprising all of these subcategories, of which socio-economic features vary considerably from each other.

Once we succeed in identifying such subcategories, the idea of introducing what may be termed as Development-Employment Multiplier Coefficient (DEMC), namely a coefficient that can measure the demand for employment to be generated by development investment, may culminate into a new methodology for development planning. However, for those

meaningful subcategories to be identified, we would require further study, for finding out empirical interrelationship among key variables discussed here. Otherwise, we may be obliged to compromise continuously with the reality, in which the firm size is employed as the only one single criterion for distinguishing formal from informal sector operations.

#### Concluding Remarks: Toward Redressal of Values and Life Styles

#### Summary of Preceding Sections

It is commonly accepted that the integrated development approach should primarily be based on the four pillar disciplines, viz. A) economic development (including business management development), B) human resources development (with focus on education and health), C) physical aspects (with focus on environmental conservation, infrastructure development and land use) and D) institutional dimensions such as development administration and finance system, non-government organizations (NGOs), political process, etc.<sup>33)</sup> The five questions highlighted in this paper have hardly touched upon the institutional dimensions because, as pointed out as the outset, the subject was already elaborated in my earlier papers contained in the Journal of International Development Studies. The five questions therefore relate to the other disciplines, viz. A, B and C above.

Of the five questions discussed in the present paper, three directly pertain to A (i. e., economic development). What I intend to stress in relation to *Question 2* (Environment vs. Growth) is that there appears to be no problem in our societies as a whole as far as the productive capability and the purchasing power for the products thus produced are concerned. However, there definitely exists a ceiling in terms of the environmental capacity and non-renewable natural resources availability, unless the human society succeeds in not only a "big leap" in technological innovation, but also the prompt and extensive dissemination of such new technology. Reliance on market mechanism is only partially relevant in this regard, for the market cannot necessarily ensure technological innovation, to say nothing of the rapid spread of such technology, that can be expensive.

My discussion on *Question 3* (Equity vs. Growth) is an attempt to confirm that the economic growth, at least in the short run, cannot be concomitant with the promotion of more equal income distribution. In this connexion, I contested the perfunctory ways by which the World Bank, one of most prestigious organizations in the international development community, attempted to challenge the Kuznets Curve. Presumably, as validated by other more reliable empirical analyses, the Kuznets Curve as yet remains very much valid, and awaits the challenges of researchers and practitioners towards the ways to cope with it through innovative policies, programmes and projects for the cause of more just and harmonious

development.

In Question 5 (Informal Sector Employment), my argument is based on the viewpoint that the informal sector should be considered as a rule rather than exception as far as the non-farm employment in the Third World is concerned. If this observation is correct, it is an extremely important subject to be tackled in the context of integrated development planning — in other words, planning for informal sector employment constitutes an important agenda. Nonetheless, statistical data presently available in most countries are inadequate for enabling us to grapple with the agenda.

Needless to stress, the promotion of non-farm employment is essential not merely as measures to ensure livelihood for the poor majority, but as the most vital mechanism to operationalize the cause of more equitable development. The modest results I was able to achieve by the study on the subject conducted in collaboration with relevant experts in Asia and ILO in the last few years only enables us to stand at the doorstep for more intensive frontal attack towards the agenda. I earnestly hope that the follow-up investigations be sustained by interested researchers and planners, besides myself.

The discussion on *Question 4* (Women in Development) highlights the dilemma between the two fundamental principles of current development thoughts, namely, (1) the universal cause of eliminating discrimination and providing equal opportunities for all regardless of sex, race or creed; and (2) the respect for the specificities of cultures and norms, departing from the imposition of a uni-linear development model, under which every society is assumed in the process toward a "modern" society as realized in the present-day western advanced nations.

While all the discriminatory norms and practices against women need to be removed, too hasty attempts for removing those norms and practices established over long history of each cultural community may more often fail than succeed. This section puts forward an operational suggestion for reconciling the obvious dilemma, by way of advocating careful monitoring for identifying the direction toward which, and the speed with which a society is moving in terms of cultural (i. e., attitudinal and behavioural) transformation. It is expected that, through such a careful monitoring, we would be able to articulate policies and programmes for managing the development process, that is, for facilitating the realization of such a societal transformation as would be both desirable and acceptable.

#### Toward Redressal of Values and Life Styles

One important issue still remains undiscussed. That is the question pertaining to our values and life styles. It was in fact pointed out in relation to *Question 1* (Development for Whom?), but not elaborated. Accordingly, it is taken up in this last section for completing

my paradigmatic frame of reference.

As a matter of fact, I have stressed the importance of values in defining the operational content of *capacitation*, which I used as the key concept in the configuration of my paradigm of development management.<sup>34)</sup> To be more specific particularly in the context of the present paper, what needs to be discussed is the possibility of operationalizing Arrow Lines B in Fig. 1, meaning a strategy of redressal withstanding the pressure of the world market today causing inroads from MIG to LIG (i. e., Arrow Lines A). As noted earlier, the majority of LIG still live in rural areas and engage themselves in farming and/or fishing for their livelihood. Hence, Arrow Line B must have much to do with farming and the lives of farmers. In this regard, three important examples are raised.

#### Example 1-Natural Farming Advocated by Messrs. Fukuoka and Kamduang:

The name of Mr. FUKUOKA Masanobu is steadily permeating amongst farmers, researchers and government officials concerned in several countries in Asia, such as Philippines and Thailand. His book is already translated into Thai language and being read by many. His farming method is based on four principles, namely: 1) No ploughing, 2) No fertilizer, 3) No pesticides, and 4) No weeding. The only things a farmer should do are sowing and harvesting, nothing else.<sup>35)</sup>

Under the Fukuoka system, he lets several plants grow together with rice plants in the rice field. The waste straw is just randomly spread over the field. In addition, fowl droppings are occasionally provided. These are the only things given as fertilizing inputs. According to him, no fertilizer is in fact required because plants have its own potential for reproduction. The soil in his field, which is not ploughed, is more black and softer than those under conventional farming, for the worms in the soil take care of soil preparation. Numerous number of spiders, large and small, serve as the most effective natural enemy against leaf hoppers and other harmful insects. He does not employ wet paddy system, but dry upland method. And yet, most surprisingly, he has been able to harvest almost six tons of rice per hectare with this method. In case of orange, twenty tons! "Nature is as fertile as that" he says. Further, "Fowl droppings are required only when the soil is extremely poor."

During the Overseas Fieldwork of GSID<sup>36)</sup> in Changwad Korat of Northeast Thailand in October 1993, I had a chance to interview Mr. Kamduang Pasi, a Thai farmer who, without knowing anything about Fukuoka method, has come to almost exactly the same conclusion as Fukuoka's. Mr. Kamduang told us that he did suffer from insect damage for the initial two years after he adopted the natural farming, for all the insects driven away by insecticides sprayed in the nearby fields came to his farm. However, after the third year onward, no problem any more, for the number of spiders has increased large enough to bring about an

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ecological equilibrium against the harmful insects.

He confidently told us: "My yield is no worse than those of my neighbours who are spending a lot for various inputs besides their time for hard labour; Furthermore, his yield is still increasing." He said he enjoys exchange of information and experience with Mr. Fukuoka, whom he meets every once in a while. So far, he has been sent to 71 out of all 74 changwads (provinces) in Thailand for delivering lectures, etc., under the auspices of Thai government.

Why, then, don't many farmers join his natural farming? He replied: "The idea being so new and totally against what they have been doing in the past years, they are simply afraid. It's a pity that they cannot do away with such an unrewarding practice." He added however that the number of those who have adopted his method are steadily increasing. "Seeing is believing. I already have something to demonstrate before their own eyes."

What Mr. Fukuoka or Mr. Kamduang says first sounds like a magic and hard to believe. In spite of that, it appears that their contentions are already supported by undeniable evidence. However, we should realize that, once their method starts spreading, its socioeconomic implications are almost revolutionary. As already pointed our by Fukuoka, <sup>37)</sup> most of the businesses such as distributing fertilizers, insecticides, farming machines and so on, out of which the agricultural cooperatives are making big profit, are no longer necessary. Huge vested interest can be jeopardized, which constitutes not a small power that supports the present political system.

Presumably, all what we need is the courage to challenge the task of rederessal for approaching the cause of an environment-friendly, sustainable development. On that score, a comment made by Mr. Kamaduang is unforgettable: "Don't be too greedy, don't demand too much. Nature is very rich. We can rely on it, so long as we are modest."

#### Example 2-Tameike (Small Reservoir) Method:

Eesaan Region (Northeast) of Thailand is known of its prevalent poverty, owing primarily to the chronic climatic pattern of recurrent floods and droughts that alternately plague the region. Eesaan being a huge plateau with very small watershed forest area and poor retention capacity of the soil, the development of large-scale water reservoir and irrigation network is technically unfeasible. Naturally, therefore, there is no way for farmers but to dig a small-scale reservoir. To make the things worse, owing to the rock salt layer that extensively underlies the region, those reservoirs have been designed shallow enough in order not to touch the rock salt. Shallow reservoirs are susceptible to quick evaporation and hence, very inefficient.

In order to remedy the situation, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) has

introduced an experimental project for digging *tameike* (small reservoir), following the method brought to Japan from China about one thousand years ago by Kukai, a top-rank priest of Japan of that time.

A tameike should be dug deep enough, regardless of the rock salt layer. Therefore, the water stored in the pond is brackish at first. However, after about two years, the whole water body gets non-brackish as a result of the seepage effect — the brackish water being heavier than the rainwater that accumulates towards the surface, the former is gradually expelled into the soil at the bottom of the pond. The JICA-sponsored experimental project near Khonkaen has succeeded in convincing the incredulous farmers. *Tameike* has started to spread in Eesaan area.

No doubt, the sweet water thus made available year-round is not enough for double cropping of paddy. However, a *tameike* of, say, 10m by 10m is enough for a farmer to grow vegetables, to culture fish (cat-fish is a favourite food for Eesaan people) and/or edible frogs, which can bring quite attractive cash income to otherwise poor farmers. A farmer we interviewed told us that his cash income increased by almost ten times compared with the time he was growing paddy only. According to him, the income is sufficient for sending his children to high schools. He said he is no longer interested in seasonal migration to Bangkok for earning money with all the botherance; he is now thinking of renting part of his land for digging a few more *tameike* for his neighbours whose lands are too small to do so.

What would happen if too many Eesaan farmers dig *tameike*, thus causing oversupply of fish, frogs, vegetables and so on in the market and another type of impoverishment over farmers who will have made investments? Perhaps such a worry would be redundant, for the increase in production will lead to new ideas of agro-processing. It would be totally wrong to assume that the farmers are insensitive and incapable of responding to changing circumstances.

#### Example 3-llau ng Buhay, an Eco-development Approach in Bohol, Philippines:

Extensive denudation of forest causing soil erosion, silting in river beds and irrigation channels, and increase in the incidence of floods at the lower reaches of large rivers is a well-known sequence of events in the Philippines. The silted soil further moves to the off-shore continental shelf and fills the coral reefs, causing death of corals. Loss of corals results in lower rate of fish reproduction, for the small fish cannot find places to protect themselves in the absence of coral reefs.

The sequence of events noted above means decline of income for fishermen. As a result, some unscrupulous fishermen have started resorting to the so-called dynamite fishing ——invade into somebody elses' fishing ground while it is still dark before sunrise, explode

dynamite, collect the fish thus killed by the shock of the explosion, and run away to the market to sell them. Such a practice is indeed destructive, for it not only kills the fish but also destroys coral reels still left alive. This method became rampant around Bohol island of the Philippines.

Mr. Ramon P. Binamira, a lawyer and an old guard of the community development approach during his career in the government, got seriously concerned with the grave consequences the dynamite fishing might bring about, started to organize a movement called *Ilau ng Buhay* (Light of Life).

Under the movement, a series of dialogical camps were held in many fishing villages for spreading awareness of the cause of sustainable development amongst fishermen. Under the funding support of USAID, UNICEF etc., the movement has organized several essential eco-development actions in collaboration with the government.<sup>38)</sup>

First, a deal was made with the "rural squatters" who illegally encroach upon the forest, cut trees and grow certain crops for their livelihood. Government permitted them to use the forest land so long as they comply with the government specifications for afforestation (e. g. contour bunding). The seedlings were provided free of charge by the government.<sup>39)</sup>

On the seaside, they constructed what they call "artificial coral reefs," a number of quadrangular pyramid-shaped structures made of thick-stemmed bamboo (one side is 4 to 6 meter in length), and sink those in the sea at about 500m off the shore line. They say that after a while the seaweed starts growing around the structures, and serve as surrogate to the coral reef —— places where small fish can hide themselves against the attack of bigger fish.

Ilau ng Buhay is now established as a self-financing non-governmental organization, and conducts research and training activities addressed to government officials and community representatives. Their manifesto written by Mr. Binamira quoted below is revealing in many ways. First, it takes a shape analogous to the Apostles' Creed of the Catholic Church, meaning that the message is made in a form easily acceptable to the majority (near to 90% of Filipino population are Catholics); Second, it stresses common sense, simple values and community solidarity. These points to the revitalization of traditional community spirit, discouraging outmigration to Manila, and third, the spirit of ecodevelopment, which is self-explanatory. Here again, the essential undertone is modesty, rather than greed that has been spurring the economic growth of all societies.

#### CREDO/Ilau ng Buhay

I BELIEVE... That the darkness that breeds poverty, disease and death can be brightened with the candle of Reason and Common Sense.

I BELIEVE... That Truth should be the basis of action, that understanding should precede decision,

That every problem has a root cause which, once discovered, might be solved through common effort.

I BELIEVE... That my child makes me immortal, for his flesh is my flesh and his blood, my blood.

And I shall rear him with all care and bring forth only those who can fill my place when I go away, never to return.

I BELIEVE... That God gave to me in trust this fragrant Earth, the forest dew, clean air from its trees and the bounty of the Seas so I might live...

If I maintain this delicate harmony with Mother Nature and harvest only what she can replenish.

I BELIEVE... In the wisdom of the culture of my forefathers, in the values that are simple, decent and fair and reject all that is trickery, hypocrisy and pretense, thereby preserving the Filipino as a Nation.

#### AND I APPEAL TO YOU, ALMIGHTY GOD:

To give me the courage, the strength and the resolve to bring the light of *Ilau* ng Buhay to all within my reach, for it is what will give meaning to my life.

— Ramon P. Binamira

There is an end to everything. Just like dinosaurs died out at one point of the archeological history, the human race may also be bound to disappear sooner or later by destroying the nature through the conventional market forces. At issue here for us therefore might be no more than an international development strategy for decelerating the global motion towards extinction. Nonetheless, in this regard, there is a fascination common to all the three examples reviewed above. The values and operational principles that seem to transpire invariably out of these examples are certainly different from what the conventional market forces urge us to follow. I believe, once again referring to Fig 1, that the three examples reviewed above, among others, certainly shed light on our task of operationalizing the information flow and redressal of values denoted by Arrow Line B. I for one would like to submit that the innovative values and operational principles inherent in those examples be explored to the fullest extent, in accordance with the cause of sustainable and more equitable development, particularly in the context of the life of LIG. Needless to say, such an exploration will have profound implications to the ways by which the ODA be designed and utilized. A new world may then reveal itself, hopefully, before extinction.

#### **NOTES**

- 1) Nagmine, H., "Capability Building for Development Management" (1) and (2) contained in *Journal of International Development Studies*, vol. 1, No. 1 and No. 2, Japan Society for International Development, Tokyo, 1991 and 1992 respectively.
- 2) For this reason, as a matter of first approximation, with reference to the World Bank's classification, both "High Income Countries" (constituting about 15% of world population) and "Low and Middle Income Countries in Europe and Central Asia" are subsumed in AC category (about 9% of world population. The latter connotes former Soviet Union and East European nations. Although the level of per capita income of the latter group expressed in US Dollars is not necessarily high, those nations are included in AC in view of their level of industrialization and energy use.) (Ref. World Bank, World Development Report 1994).
- 3) This Figure is first published in Nagamine, "Diversity, Participation and Market Economy," *Journal of International Development Studies*, vol. 3. June 1994. p. 227 (The Note for Discussion at the Plenary Panel Discussion, 4th Annual Meeting of the Japan Society for International Development, December 1993 at Nagoya)
- 4) Refer, for example, to MATSUI Ken'ichi, "Sekai-no Energy-Seron-o-Yomu (Options on Energy, A Global Survey, Japanese Text), Denryoku-Shimpo-sha, 1991, Tokyo. p. 165.
- 5) World Bank, East Asian Miracle, Oxford University Press, 1993.
- 6) Refer, i. a. Brown, Lester R., *State of the World*, Worldwatch Institute, New York, 1994, Chapter 10 (pp. 177-197).
- 7) I am grateful to Dr. IKEMOTO Yukio, CSEAS, Kyoto University and Assoc. Prof. OSADA Hiroshi of GSID for providing useful comments for my completing this section. Needless to say, however, whatever flaws or weaknesses that may be inherent belong to myself only.
- 8) Kuznets, Simon. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review* 45 (1) pp. 1–28, 1955.
- 9) Williamson, J. G. Inequality, Poverty and History, 1991, Basil Blackwell, Oxford,. U. K., pp. 7-19.
- 10) Lo, F & Kamal S., eds. Growth Pole Strategy and Regional Dvelopment Policy, Pergamon, 1978, p. 48.
- 11) World Bank, WDR '90, pp. 48-50
- 12) IKEMOTO Yukio, "Income Inequality in Thailand in the 1980s," contained in *Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 30 No. 2, CSEAS. Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan September 1992, pp. 213-235 (English Text)
- 13) In writing this section, I am indebted to professor TANIGUCHI Yoshiko of Aomori Public College, who joined me in the study on gender questions as GSID Visiting Fellow from May '93 to March '94, and several female students whose MA Thesis I have supervised. I extend my cordial gratitude to all of them. In particular, I owe to the insightful suggestions of SUZUKI Kanako, one of those students.
- 14) Committee for Development Planning (CDP), "Development Strategy for 1990s" 1989, United Nations, New York.
- 15) Moser, Caroline O. N. "Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs" DPU Gender and Planning Working Paper No. 11, 1986, quoted in Taniguchi, Yoshiko, "Feminist Perspective on Sustainable Development", GSID Discussion Paper, No. 25 1994, p. 6.
- 16) Moser, C. N. op. cit, quoted in Taniguchi, op. cit, p. 10.

- 17) Taniguchi, op. cit, pp. 28-30.
- 18) MA Thesis by Suzuki Kanako, Gender and Third World Development, GSID, 1993 85p, p. 21.
- 19) Becker, Gary S., A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1981.
- 20) Sen, Amartya K. Resource, Values and Development, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984.
- 21) ILO, The Dilemma of the Informal Sector, Report of the Director General for International Labour Conference 78th Session, 1991, 65p, p. 11. However a caution is noted that these figures are not comparable among countries and they are only illustrative and subject to unknown margins of error.
- 22) Thomas, J. J. *Informal Economic Activity*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1992 provides interesting accounts in this reagrd. Some of them present empirical evidences.
- 23) ILO, op. cit. p. 4.
- 24) ILO, Employment, Incomes and Equality: A strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya, Geneva, 1973.
- 25) Gatchalian, Jose C. and Milflora M. Gatchalian, "Country Review: The Philippines," contained in Nagamine H. ed. *Urban Informal Sector Employment*, Research Institute for Regional Planning and Development (Chiiki-Mondai Kenkyu-sho) Nagoya, 1993. 182p. with annexes. pp. 83-122.
- 26) Syahrir, Kartini, "Country Review: Indonesia" contained in Nagamine, ed. op. cit. pp. 38-56
- 27) Hutasserani, Suganya and Yongittikul, Twatchai, "Country Review: Thailand" contained in Nagamine, op. cit. pp. 123-147.
- 28) United Nations, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and Pacific, 1990, pp. 133, ff.
- 29) Kundu, Amitabh, "Country Review: India" contained in Nagamine. ed. op. cit., pp. 9-32.
- 30) ILO/ARTEP, Urban Self Employment in Thailand, A Study of Two Districts in Metropolitan Bangkok, New Delhi, 1985.
- 31) Maung Maung Lwin, "Case Study in Bangkok, Thailand" contained in Nagamine, ed. op. cit. pp. 149-168.
- 32) Sethuraman, S. V. "Employment Planning in Urban Informal Sector," contained in Nagamine. ed. op. cit. pp. 169-An. 7
- 33) Analysis on rural to urban migration and other demographic characteristics can be dealt with either as part of A and/or B domains, from different angles.
- 34) Nagamine, op. cit, Journal of International Development Studies, vol. 1. No. 1, 1991
- 35) FUKUOKA, Masanobu, Wara Ippon-no Kakumei (One Straw Revolution, Japanese Text), Shunju-sha, Tokyo. First published in 1983. 19th print in 1993. 276p. pp. 48-49.
- 36) GSID has started an Overseas Fieldwork of about a month in a developing country in Asia since 1992. For its objective and operational content, refer to Nagamine, "Integrated Development Analysis," Journal of International Development Studies, vol. 3, 1994. pp. 193-200.
- 37) Fukuoka, Masanobu, op. cit. 95p.
- 38) For further details, refer to Binamira, Ramon P. The Ilau ng Buhay: Learning through Experience, Ilau International Center, 1982. 13p., and Pestelos, Nestor M., "A Case Study on Local Level Planning in Cortes, Bohol, Philippines," A paper presented at Expert Group Meeting on Social Development Alternatives, October 1985, UNCRD, Nagoya, 40p. with Annexes.
- Central Visayas Regional Project Office, Republic of the Philippines, Project Summary, August 1986,
   17p, p. 11.

International Development: For Whom, and How?

# [SUMMARY]

This paper discusses six questions that presumably constitute vital cornerstones of the paradigm of international development, as the sequel to my earlier papers on development management capability building. First is on the question of development for whom, by way of breaking down the global population into LIG (Low Income Group), MIG (Middle Income Group) and HIG (High Income Group), as well as denoting the difference of the composition of the three groups between advanced countries (AC) and Third World countries (TWC). Having the matrix in perspective, an argument is put forward that it is LIG of TWC that requires utmost attention in articulating development strategies henceforth. It is not merely raising their economic income that matters, but the extent to which and ways by which we should respect their needs and aspirations for realizing the cause of sustainable development. Second is on the growth versus the capacity of environment and non-renewable natural resources. Of several conceivable policy options for reconciling the dilemma, the importance of socio-cultural and even political dimensions is stressed in parallel with technological considerations. Third was on the classical problem of growth versus equity. An attempt is made to validate the Kuznets Curve hypothesis, contesting the World Bank's World Development Report of 1990, a special issue on poverty.

The fourth topic briefly summarizes the conclusions of a study on gender questions I associated myself recently, putting forward an operational suggestion for reconciling the two conflicting current development thoughts, namely, the eradication of discrimination of all kinds (that of gender is a typical case in point), and the respect for situation specificities in terms of values, aspirations, life styles and so forth. Fifth is on the tentative conclusions that have transpired out of a cross-national comparative study on the theme of planning for employment in the urban informal sector, conducted jointly with researchers of five Asian countries and an ILO expert. Although the findings made are highly preliminary, my concern is to make the planning for employment, the most vital element in development planning, more pragmatic and effective. The sixth and last topic is on the radical redressal in drawing out a meaningful, sustainable as well as acceptable development scenarioes with focus on the values and aspirations of LIG in the Third World. Examples cited include the natural farming promoted by Fukuoka et al, *Tameike* system being propagated in Northeast Thailand by JICA, and the *Ilau ng Buhay* eco-development movement in the Philippines.